Introduction
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to advance competition in the market for local exchange service by promoting facilities-based investment.' In implementing the new legislation, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") stressed the importance of preserving the investment incentives of both the incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") and the competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"). 2 However, economic research has explained that forcing an Act of 1996 , 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1081 (1997 . 7 See, e.g., MARK GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 158 (1998) .
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One could reasonably argue that the demand for ILEC services would also fall during an economic slowdown. Thus, the ILECs' costs of capital would rise during a recession, which would render the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis more difficult to test. However, as we explain below, empirical evidence shows that, on the whole, the ILECs' betas were constant during the recession that spanned from July 1990 to March 1991. Consequently, any increase in the ILECs' betas during the current recession can be attributed to mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices.
One could also argue that, because TELRIC is not compensatory, ILECs will be subjected to increased risk from mandatory unbundling in both expansions and recessions. In particular, certain CLECs would take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity regardless of a recession. Although such a phenomenon would make it more difficult to test the validity of the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis, it would not invalidate that hypothesis or make it inconsequential. Certain CLECs build their own networks or build portions of their own networks. These CLECs would be more likely to lease from the ILECs during a recession, when economic conditions are unfavorable to facilities-based investment.
Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity unbundling at TELRIC prices in a manner that would benefit the ILECs. 9 Specifically, the report implied that CLECs would lose the opportunity to lease all network elements as an "unbundled network element platform," better known as UNE-P. The report was significant because UNE-P had become an entry strategy for CLECs that relied on regulatory arbitrage: UNE-P is functionally equivalent to resale, yet it is more favorably priced for the CLECs than is resale. UNE-P is priced at the sum of the TELRIC estimates of each of the ILEC's network elements required to provide local access service. In contrast, resale is priced by deducting avoided retailing costs from the ILEC's retail rate for local access service. The practical effect of ending the pricing arbitrage created by UNE-P would be to force CLECs to pay resale prices or resort to an entire or partial facilities-based business model for providing local telephony. Put differently, UNE-P would not go away; it would simply be priced by arms-length negotiation between ILECs and CLECs rather than by a regulatory commission. As a result of the dramatic competitive ramifications of this regulatory development, the stock prices of the ILECs and telecommunications equipment manufacturers rose sharply. 0 However, a rigorous statistical test of the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis is necessary before a conclusion can be drawn on the effect that mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices exerts on an incumbent's cost of equity.
A formal test of the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis would estimate the ILECs' beta parameter over the business cycle and determine whether beta had risen, fallen, or remained unchanged during the recession. The National Bureau of Economic Research ("NBER") has declared the U.S. economy in a state of recession since March 2001. With stock market data from a recent recession now available, this paper seeks to perform the Jorde-Sidak-Teece test to determine whether mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices increases the ILECs' cost of equity. Part II reviews the relevant literature on beta estimation and the estimation of structural change in beta parameters. Part III presents our econometric findings, and Part IV compares those results to the empirical research by Robert B. Feb. 12, 2003) . NBER does not adhere to the common definition of a recession as two successive quarters of negative growth. Rather, it uses a series of broad economic indicators to understand the overall performance of the U.S. economy. Given those indicators, NBER had yet to determine, as of January 2003, that the economy was again expanding and that a new downturn would constitute a new recession.
Ekelund and George S. Ford, 2 whose results conflict with the JordeSidak-Teece hypothesis. 3 I. The Estimation of Beta An ILEC's beta is the slope coefficient from the time-series regression of the ILEC's stock returns to the return on a market index.
14 One can obtain a single estimate for beta during a given time interval, or one can obtain beta estimates from different time intervals and perform an analysis that statistically compares those two estimates. We discuss these two methods below.
A. Obtaining a Single Estimate for Beta
Define the returns to stock i in period t as
where Pi,, is the closing stock price at time t, and Pi,,, is the closing stock price from the prior period. Similarly, define the market returns in time period t as follows:
PM,, is the closing market value in period t, and PM,,-, is the market value at the close of the prior period. Firm i's beta, denoted Pl, is the slope parameter from the linear regression that estimates Equation 3:
The parameter a is the intercept parameter, and u, is a disturbance term. The sample includes all observations where t is within the interval 11, 2,.. T}. Using econometric techniques, we seek to find an estimate of fP, which we will call ,8.
Obtaining an accurate estimate of beta can be difficult, because that estimate can change as T, the number of observations in the regression, changes." This finding complicates the estimation in two ways. First, one can obtain systematically lower or higher estimates of beta when one uses It is therefore desirable to use daily returns (rather than weekly or monthly returns) to estimate beta. However, increasing the estimation period increases the likelihood that the structure of the firm in question has changed, causing beta to change. 23 If one were to estimate a single beta during a particular time interval when two different beta values existed, the beta estimate would be biased. 24 Consequently, one should not assume that beta has remained stationary over an entire estimation period. Furthermore, it is wise to test for structural change in beta to better gauge the proper time interval to use during the estimation.
B. Testing for Structural Change in P?
One can use a simple F-test to determine whether beta has structurally changed within a time interval. 25 We seek to determine whether the ILECs' betas are higher during recessions than during expansions. To test for this difference, one would estimate the following:
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Because the firms in this study (BellSouth, Qwest, SBC, and Verizon) are large, increasing the number of observations in a regression sample could place upward bias on the beta estimates. Therefore, we perform our beta regressions with varying sample sizes to control for the effect that firm size might have on our estimates of beta. FIN. STRATEGIC DECISIONS 7, 8, 12 (2000) .
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Id. at 8.
24
25
Id. at II. 
During an economic expansion, Dr equals zero, and therefore the predicted return for firm i is written as
During a recession, the indicator variable Dr equals one, and the return equation then becomes
To determine whether beta is structurally different during the recession period, one could test statistically the null hypothesis that fir = 0. If this hypothesis were rejected, then one would conclude that beta has fundamentally changed during the recession.
II. Econometric Results
We regress daily returns for the three largest ILECs (BellSouth, SBC Communications, and Verizon) on daily returns for both the S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA"). We use both indexes in our analysis to determine whether our results are consistent. The dataset contains daily returns between January 1996 and December 2002. , 1999 and December 31, 2002 , so that the sample contains exactly twenty-two months of expansionary data and twenty-two months of recessionary data. Comparing an equal number of trading days under both the expansion and the recession allows us to mitigate any potential beta bias that firm size could place on the beta estimates. The second sample in our analysis contains returns from trading days between March 1, 1998 and December 31, 2002, such that three years of expansion data are included in this dataset. We include these regressions in our analysis to determine if our empirical findings are robust. Table I contains regression results from fl estimation using daily returns between Also relevant to the validity of this test is the volatility of the ILECs' returns during the recession that spanned from July 1990 to March 1991. See NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE EXPANSIONS AND CONTRACTIONS, available at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html/. If the ILECs' betas increased during the recession of 1990, a test of Jorde-Sidak-Teece would need to show that any increase in the ILECs' betas during the 2001 recession exceeded the increase in their betas during the 1990 recession. However, a regression of the daily return to an average index of ILECs (Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Southwestern Bell) returns shows that their betas were constant during the 1990 recession. In particular, regressing daily returns from the ILEC Index on daily returns from the S&P 500 Index from between July 1990 and February 1994, one finds that the coefficient on Rm*D, equals -0.003 and is not significant statistically. Using the DJIA as the market index, the regression parameter on RM*D, equals 0.06 and is not significant in a statistical sense.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 20:389, 2003 S&P 500 Index as the market index are presented first, and estimates that used the DJIA as RM follow. Note: The S&P 500 Index and DJIA beta regressions for BellSouth show evidence of heteroskedasticity at the 5 percent significance level. When we re-estimated these equations using White-Huber standard errors, we found that the coefficient on RM*D, was still significant in both BellSouth equations at the 5 percent level.
In Table 2 we find that the estimated coefficients on RM*Dr are positive for the BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon regressions. This finding holds regardless of whether one uses the returns on the S&P 500 Index or the returns on the DJIA. Also, the coefficient on RM*Dr is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for BellSouth and Verizon.
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The 81 estimates in Table 2 are economically significant. Using S&P 500 Index returns, we estimated that Verizon's 8l was 0.62 during the expansion period, and 0.89 during the recession. Therefore, a 1 percent increase in the S&P 500 Index had an impact on Verizon's stock returns that was 0.27 percentage points greater during the recession. Put
In the Verizon regression using DJIA retums to proxy for market returns, the coefficient on Ru*D, is significant at the 5.2% level. We also performed the regressions in Table 2 with the inclusion of dividend returns to the ILECs' daily returns. The results were nearly identical to those in Table 2 . For the BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon regressions that used the S&P 500 Index to proxy for market returns, the coefficients on RM*D,. were positive and significant statistically. The regression parameter on RM*D, was also positive and significant statistically for the BellSouth and Verizon regressions that included DJIA returns as a right-hand-side variable. The coefficient on RM*D,. was not significant, either economically or statistically, in the Qwest regressions.
Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity differently, the volatility in Verizon's stock price relative to the S&P 500 Index increased by 44 percent during the recession. 30 Using the DJIA to proxy for the overall market returns, we found that Verizon's P0 increased from 0.63 during the expansion period to 0.84 during the recession. Hence, the beta regression that uses the DJIA indicates that Verizon's stock was 31 33 percent more volatile during the recession.
The increased volatility of the ILECs' stock during the recession increased their costs of equity. Equity cost is found by multiplying a firm's ,. by the market premium, and then adding the return on a risk-free asset. 32 When ,P increases, one determines the corresponding increase in equity cost by multiplying the change in / by the market return. Table 3 uses the results in Table 2 to determine the changes in equity cost that each ILEC experienced during the recession. To derive these figures, we used a market return of 8.9 percent for the S&P 500 Index and a market return of 8.3 percent for the DJIA, which are the annual returns on those indices since the late 1940s. Beta regressions for Qwest Communications, a company with ILEC operations, may be of additional interest. For the Qwest regressions, the coefficient on RM*D, is insignificant in both statistical and economic respects. In particular, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 6 -0 for Qwest. Also, the estimates of"f,, that we obtained for Qwest (-0.01 when using either the S&P 500 Index or the DJIA) are very close to zero. Therefore, we find no evidence that Qwest's beta changed during the recession. Qwest, however, has business operations other than local exchange service provision. For example, Qwest provides long-distance service outside its local exchange areas. See QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INT 'L INC., 2001 SEC FORM 10-K, at 7 (2002 . In addition to providing long-distance service, Qwest also owns an Internet backbone network and provides substantial Internet services as part of its business operations. See id. at 2-4. Therefore, the difference between Qwest's business operations and those of BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon during the sample period provides one cogent explanation why the regression results fbr Qwest deviate from those of the other ILECs.
A comparison of the expansionary betas of Qwest, relative to those of the other ILECs, also confirms this fundamental difference. We estimated Qwest's beta during the expansion to be 1.40 using the S&P 500 Index and 1.26 using the DJIA. The expansionary betas for BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon ranged between 0.45 and 0.77. Clearly, Qwest's business operations, on the whole, fundamentally differ from those of BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon. See. e.g., GRINBLATT & TiTMAN, supra note 7, at 465.
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The average yearly return on the S&P 500 Index has been 8. The results in Table 3 indicate that Verizon's equity costs rose by 2.36 percentage points when the S&P 500 Index was used to proxy for RM and by 1.78 percentage points when the DJIA was used instead. Similarly, BellSouth's equity costs increased by 4.13 percentage points using the S&P 500 Index and by 2.37 percentage points using the DJIA. Because Verizon's and BellSouth's beta estimates during the recession were statistically different from those during the expansion period, we can conclude that the rise in equity costs for these two firms are statistically significant. Table 3 also indicates that SBC's costs of equity rose by between 0.39 percentage points and 1.57 percentage points. Neither of these estimates is statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence, however. Thus, the cost of equity for BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon increased during the recession, and the equity cost increase for two of those firms was statistically significant. Therefore, our statistical analysis supports the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis.
To determine whether our results in Tables 2 and 3 are robust, we now repeat the analysis using an extended timeframe. Table 4 displays results from the least-squares beta regressions for the four ILECs when the sample is extended to include daily returns between March 1, 1998 and December 31, 2002.
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Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity The results in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 2 . A beta regression using the S&P 500 Index indicates that Verizon's beta rose from 0.60 to 0.88, and BellSouth's beta rose from 0.47 to 0.91. Both of these increases are statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence. SBC's beta rose from 0.69 to 0.84, an increase that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. Using the returns from the DJIA to proxy for RM, one finds that Verizon's beta increased significantly from 0.59 to 0.85, and BellSouth's beta increased from 0.53 to 0.87, and those increases are statistically significant. Finally, the beta for SBC increased by a small amount, and that increase was not statistically significant.
III. Comments on the Empirical Findings by Ekelund and Ford
Empirical research by Ekelund and Ford conflicts with our statistical findings. The authors found that the betas for BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon
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were lower during the recession than during the economic expansion. However, an examination of their estimates reveals that their results could be inaccurate for the following three reasons. First, the authors misconstrued the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis. Second, Ekelund and Ford used weekly returns rather than daily returns. Third, they did not use a full recession cycle in their estimation. After discussing these three problems with the Ekelund-Ford study, we show why their regression results seem unreasonable given recent stock market events.
A. Problems with the Ekelund-Ford Study
Ekelund and Ford incorrectly interpreted the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis. Jorde, Sidak, and Teece argued that mandatory unbundling of network elements at prices that are not compensatory will subject the ILECs to greater risk, and therefore increase their costs of equity. 3 5 Ekelund-Ford, however, do not mention TELRIC pricing in their explanation of the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis. 3 6 Even though this error cannot explain the divergence of the empirical findings in Ekelund-Ford from the results presented here, it is critical to distinguish the implications to the ILECs of mandatory unbundling under both TELRIC and compensatory pricing. If the prices of UNEs fully compensated the ILECs for the real option value of their networks, their risk exposure from mandatory unbundling would be insignificant. Alternatively, the ILECs' risk exposure increases when UNEs are leased at TELRIC prices and with greater intensity-a phenomenon that would occur during a recession. Only because ILECs are compensated for UNE-P arrangements at TELRIC prices should one expect mandatory unbundling to increase their costs of capital during a recession.
The empirical analysis in Ekelund-Ford relies on weekly returns data. However, Monte Carlo studies have found that beta estimation using daily returns is superior to an analysis that uses weekly returns. 3 " The efficiency gain in econometric estimation from using daily returns results from the larger sample size. Increasing the number of observations in the regression sample decreases the standard errors of the regression estimates, and it thus allows one to take advantage of large-sample properties of the leastsquares estimator. 38 Consequently, the regressions in the Ekelund-Ford study could have been estimated with greater precision had the authors used daily returns in their analysis." Table 5 FIN. 139, 139, 145 (2002) . Also, Peiro finds slight evidence that daily retums data exhibit some asymmetries, while weekly retums data tend to be symmetric. See id. at 145. Finally, Peiro qualifies his finding by stating that "asymmetry does not seem to be a stylized fact
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Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity return regressions in Ekelund-Ford using daily rather than weekly returns data. We also include empirical results that use the DJIA Index to proxy for the market return. Comparing the S&P 500 Index regressions to those that use the DJLA gives an additional robustness test that Ekelund-Ford omitted. Note: In Table 5 we report White-Huber robust t-statistics in the BellSouth, Verizon, and ILEC Index regressions.
The regression results in The applicability of Peiro's research to the Jorde-Sidak-T cece hypothesis is questionable, because Peiro studies only a sample of twenty-five firms, none of which provide local exchange service. See id. at 143. An analysis of weekly returns used in the Ekelund-Ford paper indicates that those data are neither normally distributed nor symmetric. In particular, a skewness-kurtosis test for normality rejects the null hypotheses that the weekly returns of BellSouth, SBC, S&P 500 Index, or Verizon are normally distributed. In addition, but for the three-year sample of weekly returns for Verizon, the skewness-kurtosis test rejects the null hypothesis that these returns are symmetric. Furthermore, a Shapiro-Wilkinson test for normality rejects the null hypotheses that the weekly returns data are distributed according to the normal density function. Only for the three-year sample of Verizon returns does the p-value for the normality test exceed 0.05-it is 0.06 in that case. Therefore, the weekly returns data in the Ekelund-Ford paper do not exhibit the characteristics that they claim justify the use of those data over daily returns. See Ekelund & Ford, supra note 12, at 385 n.9 (citing the results in Peiro as justification of using weekly returns data). Consequently, one must question the author's decision to forgo the opportunity to improve the efficiency of their estimates by using daily returns data.
17, 2002. In particular, the estimated coefficients on the RM*Dr variable are positive in the BellSouth, Verizon, and ILEC Index 40 regressions. Also, the regression parameter on RM*Dr is significant statistically in the BellSouth regression that uses the DJIA as the market index. Had Ekelund and Ford taken steps to increase the efficiency of their regression results, and therefore used daily rather than weekly returns, they would have been forced to conclude that the ILECs' risk exposure increased between 42 Consequently, the results in the Ekelund-Ford study do not necessarily contain a full business cycle. A proper analysis of the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis would be constructed once the full business cycle, or even multiple business cycles, had been declared. Hence, the regressions in the Ekelund-Ford study use a smaller return interval than, and are therefore less efficient than, the regressions that we present here.
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B. The Implausibility of the Ekelund-Ford Results in Light of StockMarket Reactions to the FCC's Possible Elimination of UNE-P
Recent events in the stock market cast serious doubt on the plausibility of the Ekelund-Ford results. On January 6, 2003, certain telecommunications stocks rallied sharply in response to a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal reporting that FCC Chairman Michael Powell would effectively end LNE-P by reducing the number of network elements that the ILECs must offer for lease to competitors on an unbundled basis at TELRIC prices. 44 The economic significance of UNE-P is evident from JUNE 30, 2002 JUNE 30, tbl.4 (2002 .
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Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity regulatory arbitrage that UNE-P offers, and have abandoned resale in the process. 49 Their combined market value increased $1.5 billion. We now present a more rigorous event-study analysis of the market's reaction to the news concerning UNE-P. Focusing on the abnormal returns of the ILECs only would be ambiguous. 5° One can hypothesize that the ILECs experienced positive abnormal returns for either of two reasons: (1) investors expected that the ILECs would avoid losses associated with their compulsory leasing of unbundled network elements at uncompensatory prices under UNE-P, or (2) Id.
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Abnormal returns are the returns of a stock index that cannot be explained by movement in the market index. Put differently, abnormal returns for an index equal the difference between the actual returns on that index and the predicted returns that are derived from an estimated return equation (such as Equation 6 above). See, e.g., ZvI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 368 (2d ed. 1993) .
to rely disproportionately on UNE-P as an entry strategy. The first hypothesis would be consistent with increased sales of telecommunications equipment, whereas the second would be consistent with decreased sales of such equipment (on the rationale that the output of local telecommunications services would decline if the ILECs faced less competition from CLECs, and thus the industry's derived demand for telecommunications equipment would decline). Thus, the abnormal returns of telecommunications equipment manufacturers on and around January 6, 2003 are highly probative of whether mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices--epitomized in its most extreme form by UNE-P-is thought by the capital markets to increase or decrease investment in the network infrastructure required for local telephony.
To perform our event study, we calculated the abnormal returns for the ILECs and the equipment manufacturers on January 6, 2003. We used both the DJIA and the S&P 500 Index as market indexes in the analysis. Table 7 reports the findings of the event study. Note: * indicates statistical significance at 10%, ** indicates statistical significance at 1%. Table 7 indicates that the abnormal returns for the ILECs and equipment manufacturers on January 6, 2003 were positive and statistically significant. The returns for the ILECs were 6.16 percent higher than normal returns explained by the DJIA and 5.82 percent higher than normal returns as explained by the S&P 500 Index. Those returns were statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Also, the positive returns for the telecommunications equipment manufacturers exceeded by approximately 5 percent the return that the market could explain. Using the DJIA to measure normal returns, the abnormal returns of the telecommunications equipment manufacturers were significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 5 ' If mandatory unbundling of network elements at TELRIC 51 The abnormal return in an event study, which is the predicted residual from a leastsquares regression, is asymptotically normal. See. e.g., id. at 339 (discussing the calculation of abnormal returns from a least-squares regression); JUDGE, GRIFFITHS, HILL, LUTKEPOHL & LEE, supra note 38, at 264-70 (deriving the asymptotic distribution of the least-squares estimator and the residuals from the least-squares regression). Dividing a normally distributed random variable by its standard deviation yields a variable with a "standard normal distribution." See, e.g., RICHARD J. LARSEN &
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Mandatory Unbundling, UJNE-P, and the Cost of Equity prices actually encouraged investment in local telecommunications infrastructure (as the Ekelund-Ford study implies by its finding of lower equity costs for ILECs), then the abnormal returns to the telecommunications equipment manufacturers would have been negative on January 6, 2003. Instead, the positive abnormal returns to JDS Uniphase, Lucent, Nortel, and Tellabs reflected an expectation of the capital markets that these firms would have increased net cash flows, which would result from greater (not lesser) sales of telecommunications equipment. 52 In short, the findings of the Ekelund-Ford study are inconsistent with this positive reaction of the capital markets to news that the FCC might substantially reduce the attractiveness of UNE-P as a business model for CLECs.
Conclusion
We have tested the hypothesis that mandatory unbundling would increase the volatility of the ILECs' stock returns during times of recession and therefore increase the ILECs' equity costs. Different time periods and market indexes were used in the analysis to confirm that the results were robust. We find that BellSouth and Verizon experienced statistically significant increases in their equity costs during the recession. BellSouth's costs of equity rose by between 2.37 and 4.13 percentage points, while
MORRIS L. MARX, AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 215-16
(2d ed. 1986). A Z-statistic refers to a particular value along the horizontal axis of the standard normal distribution. There exists a ten percent probability that a point greater than 1.28 will be drawn from a standard normal distribution. See. e.g., id. at 576-77. Similarly, there exists a five percent probability that a value greater than 1.64 will be drawn from the standard normal. See, e.g., id. Therefore, a Zscore between 1.28 and 1.64 implies statistical significance at the ten percent level of confidence. A Zscore that exceeds 1.64 indicates statistical significance at the five percent level of precision or beyond. NEWSWIRES, Feb. 20, 2003 . The stock prices of both the ILECs and the telecommunications equipment manufacturers responded negatively to this news. On February 20, 2003, the return to the ILEC index was 5.7% lower than the normal return explained by the S&P 500 Index. The ILECs' abnormal returns were -5.5% using the DJIA as the market index. These negative abnormal returns were statistically significant at the one percent level of confidence. Also, the returns to the telecommunications equipment manufacturers were 3.3% below the normal return that the S&P 500 Index could explain and 3.2% below the normal return explained by the DJIA. Although these abnormal returns were not statistically significant at the ten percent level, the fact that they were negative further highlights the implausibility of the empirical findings in the Ekelund-Ford study.
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Verizon's equity cost increased by between 1.78 and 2.36 percentage points. The analysis also indicates that SBC's equity costs rose by as much as 1.59 percentage points, but that this increase was not generally significant in a statistical sense. These empirical findings support the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis that mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices has decreased the ILECs' incentives to invest in their own networks.
We also tested the impact that recent news of the FCC's intent to rewrite UNE-P legislation had on the stock prices of the ILECs and telecommunications equipment manufacturers. Our analysis found that the stock prices of both the ILECs and telecommunications equipment manufacturers responded positively to the prospect that the FCC would eliminate UNE-P as a mandatory offering by ILECs. Furthermore, the stock price increases of both the ILECs and equipment manufacturers were not explained by covariance with the DJIA or the S&P 500 Index. If the findings in the Ekelund-Ford study were correct, then the FCC's elimination of UNE-P as a viable CLEC strategy would deter investment in telecommunications equipment and therefore cause financial markets to devalue the stocks of such companies. The fact that the stocks of equipment manufacturers instead rallied on January 6, 2003 is additional evidence that, as the Jorde-Sidak-Teece hypothesis maintains, mandatory unbundling at TELRIC rates deters the ILECs from investing in the telecommunications network. Vol. 20:389, 2003 
